Introduction
The motivating question for this paper is whether a high degree of economic interdependence between countries reduces the probability of war between them, with the principal focus being on the First World War, which began a century ago. The issue achieves salience because the outbreak of the Great War (later renamed the First World War) followed four decades of rapidly growing economic interaction among the countries of western Europe and indeed between them and the far corners of the world. The period 1870--1913 has sometimes been called the first globalization, to be followed a hundred years later by a second great period of globalization. Actually, the first globalization was in the 16 th century, which involved the life--transforming transmission of plants and diseases around the world. The fact that the First World War broke out in 1914 is frequently adduced as evidence that high economic interdependence does not ensure that war will not take place between the relevant countries -and so it was. Often cited in this connection is Norman Angell (1910) , to the effect that the high economic interdependence and resulting common economic interests should make war inconceivable. Similar arguments are made today with respect to the modern world, and in particular the relationship between the United States and China.
2 This paper will first document the growth in economic interdependence in the late 19 th century and again in the late 20 th century. It will report the main message Angell meant to convey to his readers, which has since been much misinterpreted. It will then offer an analysis of the outbreak of World War I consistent with what Angell actually said. It puts much more weight on the role of Russia, which plausibly thought it could gain economically from a European war. Finally, it offers a few concluding remarks on the present situation, with special attention to China, a rising power, and the United States, the dominant power.
Growth of Economic Interdependence
Technological developments followed by capital investment greatly reduced both the cost and the uncertainties associated with long--distance communication and transportation in the late 19 th century, most notably the telegraph and the use of steam power for locomotion both on land and at sea. The modern era can plausibly be dated from the 1860s, which saw the laying of the first successful trans--Atlantic cable (1866), which meant for the first time a message could travel much faster than a person (and the diseases the messenger might carry). how they could possibly be useful, since war or even the threat of war could not produce greater prosperity. The book's main message was not that a high degree of economic interdependence between these two large economies would make war between them inconceivable, but rather that it would make such a war stupid (my term, not Angell's).
Concretely, even the "winner" in a war between them would end up being worse off after the victory than before. This was, in Angell's view, in sharp contrast with many previous wars, where the winner could plausibly expect to gain from a victorious war, in booty or in territory.
Modern economies were built on money and credit, both requiring trust and benign conditions that would be destroyed or badly damaged by war under modern conditions. In this of course
Angell was completely correct. Victorious Britain was worse off after the war, having inter alia depleted its overseas investments to pay for the war, not to mention having lost or maimed 6 thousands of young men, as was France. It is noteworthy, however, that although many of Angell's arguments were couched in general terms, he was specifically addressing Britain and especially Germany (as Ferguson (1998) has well noted), not all countries or even all European countries.
Origin of the Great War
Why then did such a stupid war start? Here is not the place to recount in detail the actual sequence of events leading to the German invasion of Belgium on August 3, 1914, or the extensive imputation of motivations or the "domino" logic of the relationships among events.
They have been gone over many times, and interpretations still differ a century later (see, e.g., Clark, Cowley, Ferguson, Langer, McMeekin, Taylor, Turner) . Nonetheless, it is useful briefly to review the main events, since international tensions were occasionally high over previous decades, even resulting in limited wars, but then seemed to recede, as the conflicts were "managed" diplomatically. In general, compared with earlier periods in Europe, the 19 th century was one of peace after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, managed by the "Concert of 1912--13) involving Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire. Each was brief and brought to an end by intercession of the great powers through a combination of threats and negotiation. These experiences created a climate of expectation that the "powers" could manage matters well enough to keep them from escalating out of control. But some of the powers were not so sure. Germany passed an army law in July 1913 to raise the size of its peacetime army by 136,000 to 890,000 men. France followed a month later with the controversial Three Year Law, which would extend the term of conscripts and raise the French army to 700,000. And in October Russia adopted its Great Program, to raise its winter peacetime army (i.e. outside the harvest season) by 800,000 men by 1917 (Clark, McDonald, A summit meeting between France (president Poincare joined by newly installed prime minister and foreign minister Viviani) and Russia (Tsar Nicholas and his senior officials) took place on July 20--23, and Austria did not want to act until Poincare was on his way by warship back to France, to avoid Franco--Russian coordination of their responses. Germany had hoped for quick and decisive action by Austria, whatever it chose to do, but the resulting 48--hour ultimatum to Serbia with hard conditions was not made until July 23, (with Poincare and Viviani at sea) nearly four weeks after the assassination. Perhaps surprisingly, Serbia gave a generally responsive albeit ambiguous reply, clearly rejecting only one of the conditions. But Austria wanted to punish Serbia once and for all for its impudence and anti--Austrian behavior over the preceding five years, began to mobilize its forces immediately the reply was received, and declared war on Serbia on July 28. It soon thereafter bombarded Belgrade (which was within reach from Hungarian territory) but was not prepared to invade until August 12. It was understood in Russia and elsewhere that Russian mobilization of its army would be more time consuming than mobilization in Germany, Austria, or France. Russian officials in succession ordered a pre--mobilization, a partial mobilization, and a full mobilization, the latter cancelled by the Tsar on July 29 and then re--instated a day later. Austria on July 31 responded with general mobilization, and Germany declared a "state of threatening danger of war,"
followed by a full mobilization on August 1, on which day France also mobilized. Germany, influenced by Chancellor Bethmann's sense of legal rectitude, declared war on Russia.
Germany's war plan (the Schlieffen Plan going back to 1908) entailed first hitting France hard, westward through Belgium away from the heavily fortified French--German border, requiring it to sue for peace early, thus permitting the German troops to be moved eastward to face the slow--response Russians. In a pre--emptive move, Germany invaded Luxembourg on August 2, and requested Belgium to allow its troops to pass through to the French border. slower than Germany but faster than Britain, and by an impressive six percent a year in 1908 --1913 (Maddison, 2001 McDonald, p.205) . Industrialization was beginning to take hold, largely with strong government initiative and support, including high import tariffs, even higher than those in the United States at the time (see Crisp, Miller) . If all went well, Russia could expect to gain, economically as well as in stature, territory, and population, from a successful war. As we saw in Table 1 
Personalities and Public Opinion
We tend in normal discourse to personify nations and governments. But people, not countries, make decisions. Foreign and military policy in all the great powers in 1913 were made by relatively few people, albeit influenced by press commentary in all countries, even in Russia. And the press often reflected the views of organized pressure groups and of public sentiment more generally. In Russia, Tsar Nicholas II was the ultimate decision--maker on these issues, but he was strongly influenced by foreign affairs minister Sazonov and minister of war (and general) Sukhomlinov, as well as by other members of the cabinet.
In France, Raymond Poincare was the dominant figure, even though as president he had few formal powers; Prime Minister Viviani was only a placeholder until the trial of Mme.
Caillaux concluded, and was inexperienced in foreign affairs. Joffre commanded the army. interests, but that it would work. Moltke was perhaps the most pessimistic, but he was also pessimistic about the alternatives and on balance opted for preventive war.
Lessons?
It is doubtful that one can learn lessons from history. And the lessons learned from history may be the wrong lessons, as when Germany in 1914 thought it could drive France quickly to plead for an armistice, as it did in 1871, or that winners of wars can gain in material terms, as they often had in the past.
But history can stimulate the imagination. It is certainly possible, as Angell warned in 1910, and as actually occurred in 1914--18 , that even the winner of a future war may end up much worse off than it was before the war, and, more conjecturally, than it would have been without the war.
19 Economic interdependence is much higher in 2013 than it was in 1913 for most countries, including China and the United States (see Tables 1 and 2 ). War would be extremely costly for both, beyond the direct budgetary costs. That it would be more costly to China than to the USA, because of the likely international isolation of China and quicker recovery of the United States, is small consolation. The governments of both countries recognize that. The lesson of this paper, if there is one, is to beware of third countries. Do not focus only on the leading protagonists alone. Every society has its collective hang--ups and vulnerabilities; skillful outside parties can exploit national sentiments to engender conflicts that are objectively irrational in material terms.
Who might those third countries be in the contemporary context? North Korea, Taiwan, and Iran come immediately to mind. But it is also worthwhile to keep an eye on others, e.g.
perhaps Japan and, yes, even Russia again, which might calculate that a serious conflict between China and the United States would enhance its status in the world -something that some Russians always seem to be seeking, without having to earn it.
